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We review the extensive body of studies relying on jurors’ self-reports in 
interviews or questionnaires, with a focus on potential threats to validity for 
researchers seeking to answer particularly provocative questions such as the 
influence of race in jury decision-making.  We then offer a more focused case 
study comparison of interview and questionnaire data with behavioral data in 
the domain of race and juror decision-making.  Our review suggests that the 
utility of data obtained from juror interviews and questionnaire responses 
varies considerably depending on the question under investigation.  We close 
with an evaluation of the types of empirical questions most amenable to study 
via juror self-report, as well as suggestions for more effective use of this 
method.  This Article is intended to serve as a guide for researchers interested 
in using this common strategy to understand jury decision-making, and for legal 
professionals and policymakers who seek to draw conclusions based on this 
literature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Juries’ decisions have profound consequences, yet the decision-making process is largely 
opaque.  Researchers have therefore sought to understand as much as they can about how jurors 
perceive their task, interpret evidence, and render decisions.1  One obvious approach to these 
questions is the direct one: simply ask jurors what they thought and why they reached the decision 
that they did.  This straightforward tactic is certainly appealing, but it carries risks that can render 
the information it produces suspect.  At the same time, however, some research questions are 
most accessible through this method.  Rigorous, multi-jurisdictional studies have greatly 
advanced our understanding of jury decision-making, particularly when they combine self-report 
and archival data.2  Although many researchers who use interviews are aware of the limitations 
and advantages of the method,3 no thorough and systematic evaluation of the general juror 
interview method has been published to date.  Accordingly, we envision this Article as a guide for 
researchers considering the use of juror interviews in their own work, as well as for legal 
practitioners, scholars, and policymakers who seek to draw conclusions based on studies using 
this method.  As judges and legal policymakers increasingly recognize the value of empirical 
research to guide trial strategy and reform, it becomes even more critical to conduct these types of 
studies properly and to draw the appropriate inferences from them.  Without adequate attention to 
methodological limitations, overconfidence can easily distort the conclusions we draw from what 
jurors tell us. 
In a recent conversation with a conscientious judge, one of the authors mentioned the 
                                                                 
1 See generally NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007) (examining 
how jurors make decisions and whether jurors are competent to perform the tasks expected of them); NANCY S. MARDER, 
THE JURY PROCESS 50-104 (2005). 
2 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis, & Beth Murphy, Juror 
Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 48 (2003) (discussing the Arizona 
Jury Project in which researchers examined the implications of procedural changes regarding jury deliberations); William 
J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L. J. 1043 (1995) 
(discussing the Capital Jury Project in which researchers interviewed people who had served on capital juries). 
3 See Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000) 
(describing the limitations of juror interviews, which include lack of candor, the desire to please the interviewer, the social 
desirability of certain responses, deterioration of memory, and hindsight bias). 
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consistent finding that jurors have far more difficulty understanding and applying legal 
instructions than they do understanding the facts of a case.4  The judge responded that although 
jurors in general may have trouble understanding the law, in his courtroom they do not.  When 
asked how he knew, he explained that he regularly includes the following question in his post-trial 
questionnaire: “Did you have any difficulty with the Court’s instructions on the law?  YES___ 
NO____,” and that an overwhelming majority of jurors check “NO.”  Indeed, in spite of the clear 
behavioral evidence that jurors find it difficult to apply legal instructions, few judges with whom 
we have spoken see juror comprehension as a problem in their own courtrooms. 
Discrepancies such as this one—between what jurors tell us about their decision-making 
and what archival and observational data demonstrate—raise questions about the reliability of 
information obtained from juror interviews.5  Nevertheless, the use of juror interviews is 
widespread.  Trial consultants advise litigators to interview jurors after a trial to “shed light on 
arguments the jurors found most persuasive, witnesses who were most convincing, demonstrative 
evidence that was most understandable . . . as well as provide a clearer illumination of the process 
of juror decision making and juror reaction to the key features of the trial.”6 
On the other side of the coin, another of the authors was recently asked to serve as an 
expert for a pre-trial defense motion in a capital case.  The prosecution took issue with defense 
assertions founded on studies showing that capital jurors often make up their minds about 
sentencing before guilt has been determined and that the race of the parties can affect capital 
juries’ decision-making.  The prosecution argued that these studies were fatally flawed because 
they were based in part on jurors’ self-reports.  However, the limitations of interview studies must 
be considered in light of the content of the jurors’ answers and the purpose of the research.  For 
instance, self-presentational concerns can bias jurors’ answers to questions; people are generally 
motivated to present themselves in a positive light.  But when the interviews suggest that a 
substantial number of jurors go against the judge’s instructions by deciding the sentence before 
the trial is over, such evidence of premature judgment is quite persuasive because it occurs in 
spite of jurors’ motivation to make themselves look good. 
Researchers rely on the information jurors report in post-trial interviews for a wide range 
of empirical objectives.  In Part I of this Article, we review the psychological research on the 
pitfalls associated with self-report data.  Problems associated with the passage of time, people’s 
desire to present themselves in a positive light, and lapses of memory are just a few of the factors 
                                                                 
4 See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived 
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788 (2000) (summarizing studies demonstrating that 
jurors often have trouble understanding the law that they are asked to apply to decide a case); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce 
D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589 (1997) 
(showing that jurors’ comprehension of legal instructions is poor due to unnecessary procedural obstacles in the trial 
process). 
5 In this Article, we use “jury interviews” and “juror interviews” to refer not only to face-to-face interviews 
between researchers and jurors, but also the administration of post-trial questionnaires.  Both methods essentially rely on 
jurors’ self-reported data. 
6 Marjorie Fargo, Postverdict Juror Interviews, in ALI-ABA, A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH 25-2 
(Walter F. Abbott & John Batt, eds., 1999).  See also R. Robert Samples, All Things Jury: Looking Forward with Post-
Trial Juror Interviews (May 21, 2008), http://www.wvrecord.com/news/212651-all-things-jury-looking-forward-with-
post-trial-juror-interviews (“One of the most effective research methods in a trial consultant’s toolbox is the post-trial 
interview with members of the actual jury panel.”); Jay M. Finkelman, Juror Perception of Employment Litigation, 8 THE 
PSYCHOLOGIST-MANAGER J. 45, 46 (2005) (employing post-trial interviews with jurors to evaluate how jurors process 
information and determine verdicts in employment litigation). 
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that can threaten the validity of findings premised on jurors’ self-reports.  In Part II, we review the 
literature of published studies relying on jurors’ responses to interviews and questionnaires.  We 
synthesize these findings and assess the value of the self-report method for answering different 
kinds of questions in light of the various threats to validity outlined in Part I.  In Part III, we 
provide a detailed case study of one particular question: the influence of race on jury decision-
making.  Specifically, we compare findings from juror interview studies with those obtained using 
behavioral measures, including data from a study of race and mock jury deliberations.  We end by 
evaluating the types of questions that are most (and least) appropriate for assessment via juror 
interviews, and offer suggestions for their more effective use.  Our primary aim is neither to 
encourage nor to discourage the use of juror interviews, but rather to provide a review and 
critique of this methodology that may serve as a reference for those who conduct and evaluate 
such studies in the future. 
I.   POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE VALIDITY OF SELF-REPORT DATA 
The appeal of the juror interview methodology is clear.  Many empirical questions 
cannot be addressed by archival analyses of trial outcomes, and talking with jurors about real 
cases avoids problems raised by examinations of mock jurors’ responses to simulated trials, such 
as whether or not the results are generally applicable.7  As Professor Vidmar argues, even 
carefully designed jury simulation studies tend to lack the rich complexity of even the simplest 
actual trial.8  Moreover, the likelihood that mock jurors are at least somewhat less invested in their 
task than real jurors raises questions about the generalizability of simulation studies. 
But it is well documented that self-report measures—despite their popularity across 
disciplines—have inherent limitations.9  It is important for jury researchers—as well as 
policymakers and litigators who rely on their findings—to be aware of the potential threats to 
validity posed by reliance on self-report measures and to recognize that their value depends very 
much on the nature of the specific research question.  Specifically, psychologists have identified 
several factors that threaten the validity and reliability of self-report data.10  To set the stage for 
our review of the studies relying on jurors’ self-reports, we first identify several factors that 
threaten the validity and reliability of self-report data and then briefly consider their potential 
relevance to the jury context. 
                                                                 
7 See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, Civil Juries in Ecological Context: Methodological Implications for Research, in 
CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 35, 35-65 (Brian H. Bornstein et al., eds., 
2008) [hereinafter Vidmar, Civil Juries]; Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 
54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 726-27 (2006) [hereinafter Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare]; Samuel R. Sommers & 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries?  A Review of Social Science Theory and 
Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1000-02 (2003) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really 
Know]. 
8 See generally Vidmar, Civil Juries, supra note 7. 
9 See, e.g., Elliot Aronson, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, J. Merrill Carlsmith & Marti Hope Gonzales, METHODS OF 
RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 60-63 (2d ed. 1990) (reviewing research demonstrating that people are often unable or 
unwilling to report their cognitive and affective processes accurately); Delroy L. Paulhus & Oliver P. John, Egoistic and 
Moralistic Biases in Self-Perception: The Interplay of Self-Deceptive Styles With Basic Traits and Motives, 66 J. 
PERSONALITY 1025, 1040-45 (1998); Norbert Schwarz, Robert M. Groves & Howard Schuman, Survey Methods, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 143, 143-44 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
10 See infra Part I.A-E. 
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A. Passage of Time 
Interviews often require research participants to reconstruct events or describe what they 
were thinking at an earlier point in time.  Participants’ responses are only as accurate as the 
memories underlying them, and memory is less reliable the longer the delay between event and 
interview.11  Moreover, information learned after an event can influence people’s memory of it.12  
In a legal context, having joined the jury’s unanimous verdict, a juror may reinterpret earlier 
events as being more consistent with that outcome.13  Put differently, what jurors think about a 
case after the deliberation process is often not what they thought about it at the time.  Given that 
jurors are generally unaware of these subtle shifts,14 the utility of retrospective self-report is more 
suspect when a researcher seeks to capture a juror’s attitudes at an earlier time.  Complicating 
matters further is the great variability in the lapse of time between jury service and interview, 
across and even within studies.  For example, one published study was based on interviews 
conducted between three months and seven years after trial,15 and another study was based on 
juror interviews conducted immediately after trial.16 
B. Inaccessible Information 
Some interview questions are problematic because they ask for information that 
respondents cannot realistically be expected to provide.  In a seminal article, psychologists 
Nisbett and Wilson argued that the value of introspection for determining the reasons behind 
thoughts and behaviors is limited because people are often unaware of the true influences on their 
preferences and actions.17  Even more problematic, this ignorance does not prevent people from 
offering plausible explanations for why they do what they do.18  In one experiment, participants 
who memorized “ocean-moon” as part of an ostensibly unrelated earlier task were twice as likely 
as other participants to say “Tide” when asked to name a laundry detergent.19  When questioned 
                                                                 
11 HERMANN EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 62-69 (Henry A. 
Ruger & Clara E. Bussenius trans., 1998) (1913). 
12 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and Memory: The Creation of New Memories, 
118 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 100 (1989); Harry T. Reis & Shelly L. Gable, Event Sampling and Other Methods for 
Studying Everyday Experience, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 190-
222 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000). 
13 See Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights From Psychology and Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 182, 193 (1999) [hereinafter Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory] (reviewing research on 
consistency bias, which leads people to overestimate consistency between their past and current attitudes). 
14 See generally Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint 
Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 3 (1999); Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and 
Confidence in Judgment, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499 (1991). 
15 Garvey, supra note 3, at 29 n.16. 
16 Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Timing of Opinion 
Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases: An Empirical Examination, 67 TENN. L. REV. 627, 634 (2000). 
17 Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on 
Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 255 (1977). 
18 Id. at 255.  See generally Michael I. Norton, Joseph A. Vandello & John M. Darley, Casuistry and Social 
Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL, 817 (2004); Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, 
Reason-based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11 (1993). 
19 Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 17, at 243. 
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about this response, participants did not mention the earlier, semantically relevant word pair, but 
rather offered plausible, more personal explanations such as “my mother uses Tide.”20  These 
findings raise concerns about questions that require jurors to report on higher order cognitive 
processes (e.g., “What evidence had the greatest impact on you?”) or to identify factors that 
influenced decision-making (e.g., “To what extent did the jury’s gender composition affect 
deliberations?”). 
C. Self-presentational Concerns 
Even when a respondent’s memory is strong and an interviewer’s questions focus on 
accessible information, the validity of self-report measures is threatened by the possibility that 
people may wish to conceal information.  The potential problems posed by respondents’ 
motivation to “look good”—or, at least, to avoid “looking bad”—are illustrated by studies in 
which participants who believe they are hooked up to a lie detector give more accurate and less 
socially acceptable answers to questions than do naturally responding participants.21  In a legal 
context, self-presentational concerns could prevent jurors from admitting, for example, that they 
did not understand complex scientific evidence or that they were influenced by inadmissible 
considerations.  Concern with self-presentation is likely exacerbated when a court official or 
authority figure conducts the interview, as in the judicial example at the beginning of this article.22 
D. Response Rate 
Another important consideration in evaluating self-report data is participant response 
rate.  When judges or attorneys poll a jury at the end of a trial, they have the advantage of 
speaking to jurors before they leave the courthouse.  Researchers conducting post-trial interviews 
rarely have that luxury; generally, they must track down as many jurors as possible and persuade 
them to talk about their experience, and they hardly ever manage to talk to all of the jurors.23  In 
addition to practical difficulties, researchers are also faced with the problem that the jurors they 
successfully recruit may differ from those they cannot locate or convince to cooperate.  If 
                                                                 
20 Id. 
21 See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 230 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[G]iven the human propensity 
for self-justification, it is very difficult ‘to learn from a juror’s own testimony after the verdict whether he was in fact 
“impartial.”  Certainly, a juror is unlikely to admit that he had consciously plotted against the defendant during the course 
of the trial.” (quoting Phillips v. Smith, 632 F.2d 1019, 1022 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted)), rev’d 455 U.S. 209 
(1982)).  See also Edward E. Jones & Harold Sigall, The Bogus Pipeline: A New Paradigm for Measuring Affect and 
Attitude, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 349, 358-62 (1971) (reviewing research showing that people tend to give less socially 
acceptable responses about sensitive issues when they believe that experimenters can detect lies).  But see E. Ashby Plant, 
Patricia G. Devine & Paige C. Brazy, The Bogus Pipeline and Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice: Revising the 
Fading and Faking of Racial Prejudice, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 187, 188-91  (2003); Neal J. Roese & 
David W. Jamieson, Twenty Years of Bogus Pipeline Research: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 114 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 363, 369  (1993) (presenting results from a meta-analysis showing that use of the bogus pipeline technique makes 
people provide more honest self-reports). 
22 Barry R. Schlenker & Mark L. Leary, Social Anxiety and Self-Presentation: A Conceptualization and 
Model, 92 PSYCH. BULL. 641, 647 (1982) (reviewing research on the factors that heighten self-presentational concerns). 
23 See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 2, n.205 (explaining random selection of four jurors per capital case in the 
CJP studies); Mary R. Rose, A Dutiful Voice: Justice in the Distribution of Jury Service, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 601, 614 
(reporting a 67% response rate by former jurors to requests for interviews). 
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systematic differences exist between those who respond and those who do not, interview data will 
not represent the experiences of all jurors.24  For example, a researcher interested in juror 
satisfaction might interview 80% of jurors from a sample of trials, but if the 20% who refuse to 
participate do so, at least in part, because they hated their experience, the researcher’s conclusions 
will paint an overly optimistic picture of juror satisfaction. 
E.  Question Wording 
Even something as seemingly trivial as question wording can affect self-reports.25  For 
example, Loftus and Palmer showed participants films of a car accident and asked them to 
estimate the speed of the cars on impact.26  Those asked how fast the cars were going when they 
“smashed” into each other gave significantly higher estimates than did participants asked about 
when the cars “hit,” “bumped,” “collided,” or “contacted” each other.27  Moreover, these effects 
were still evident one week later: participants who had been asked the “smashed” question were 
most likely to agree that they had seen broken glass.28  Along similar lines, a question about 
deliberations might produce different responses if phrased “how easy was it for the jury to reach a 
verdict?” versus “how difficult was it to reach a verdict?”  Different wordings could also influence 
jurors’ responses to subsequent questions and later memories of deliberation. 
II.  REVIEW OF RESEARCH USING JUROR SELF-REPORT 
To understand the advantages and limitations of juror interviews, it is important to 
consider the objectives of the researchers.  That is, what exactly do interviewers seek to find out 
from jurors?  Are jurors asked to recall past events, report current perceptions, reconstruct thought 
processes, or something else entirely?  Even more important, what sorts of conclusions do 
researchers seek to draw based on these self-reports?  In this section we review the different 
objectives of researchers who have used juror interviews or questionnaires.  In examining what 
researchers seek to achieve with this method, we identify particular issues of concern in light of 
psychological findings regarding the limitations of self-report data, and offer suggestions for 
future use and interpretation of the juror interview method.29 
                                                                 
24 Schwarz et al., supra note 9, at 143-79. 
25 See generally Norbert Schwarz, Self-Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers, 54 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 93 (1999). 
26 Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the 
Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING &VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 585 (1974). 
27 Id. at 586. 
28 Id. at 585. 
29 Researchers use juror self-reports in both single study and larger scale research projects.  The most 
extensive of these larger projects is the Capital Jury Project (CJP), an ongoing fourteen-state field study of jury decision-
making in capital trials.  See generally William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of 
Early Findings, 70 IND. L. J. 1043 (1995).  CJP data have been collected in 20 to 30 capital trials per state, divided equally 
between cases that ended in death and alternative sentences.  Four randomly selected jurors from each trial are interviewed 
at length about the trial and deliberations, touching on topics including the reasons for their decisions, the course of their 
decision-making, their assessments of the evidence, and their impressions of the witnesses.  William J. Bowers, Benjamin 
D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and 
Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 189, 197 (2001) [hereinafter Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death 
Sentencing].  In addition, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) conducted a large-scale study of juries in which 
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A.  What are Jurors’ Subjective Experiences? 
Our review of the literature indicates that a principal use of interviews is to examine 
jurors’ emotional or subjective experiences.  Interviews have focused on the stress jurors 
experience when serving on a disturbing case,30 their feelings about the fairness of various 
courtroom procedures,31 their satisfaction with the deliberation process,32 and their perceptions of 
the difficulty of the task in general.33  Sometimes researchers have attempted to discover the 
factors that predict jurors’ experiences.  Professors Eisenberg and Wells, for example, found that 
                                                                 
judges, attorneys, and jurors in 372 felony trials were surveyed to examine interactions among case characteristics, group 
dynamics, and juror demographics and attitudes in order to uncover factors associated with hung juries.  Paula L. 
Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work?  A Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of 
Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1263 (2003) [hereinafter Hannaford-Agor & Hans, Nullification at Work].  See 
also Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans & G. Thomas Munsterman, Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of 
the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2000) [hereinafter Hannaford, Hans & Munsterman, Permitting Jury 
Discussions]; PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, VALERIE P.  HANS, NICOLE L. MOTT & G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM?  NCJ 201096 (2002). 
30 See generally Leigh B. Bienen, Helping Jurors Out: Post-Verdict Debriefing for Jurors in Emotionally 
Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L. J. 1333 (1993); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Jury 
Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339 (1996) [Eisenberg, Garvey & Wells, Jury 
Responsibility in Capital Sentencing]; Thomas L. Hafemeister, Juror Stress, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 177 (1993); Joseph 
L. Hoffman, Where’s the Buck?—Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L. J. 
1137 (1995); Honorable James E. Kelley, Addressing Juror Stress: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 97 
(1994); SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY 56-57, 97-100, 130, 
159, 169-173 (2005) (examining the emotional impact of a capital case on individual jurors); Michael E. Antonio, I Didn’t 
Know It’d Be So Hard: Jurors’ Emotional Reactions to Serving on a Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 282 (2006). 
31 Carroll Seron et al., Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, 
Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L., 117 (1997); William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & 
Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing When 
the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497 (2004); ROGER MATTHEWS, LYNN HANCOCK & 
DANIEL BRIGGS, HOME OFFICE, JURORS’ PERCEPTIONS, UNDERSTANDING, CONFIDENCE AND SATISFACTION IN THE JURY 
SYSTEM: A STUDY IN SIX COURTS (2004); Mary R. Rose, A Dutiful Voice: Justice in the Distribution of Jury Service, 39 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 601 (2005); Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors’ Views Regarding the 
Peremptory Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1061 (2003); Franklin Delano Strier, Through the Jurors’ Eyes, 74 A.B.A. 
J. 79 (1988). 
32 See generally Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659  (2002); 
Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31; Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the 
Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006); Valerie P. 
Hans, Paula L. Hannaford & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial Discussions: 
The Views of Trial Participants, Judges, and Jurors, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 (1999). 
33 See JOE S. CECIL, E. ALLAN LIND & GORDON BERMANT, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 27, 33 
(Federal Judicial Center 1987) (surveying jurors about how difficult it was to understand information presented at trial and 
instructions from the judge); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in Trials: A Field 
Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 243 (1988) [hereinafter Heuer & 
Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in Trials] (using juror’s ratings of the difficulty of reaching unanimity and the 
difficulty of personal voting as factors to analyze jury deliberations).  See generally WARREN YOUNG, NEIL CAMERON & 
YVETTE TINSLEY, JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, PT. 2, in PRELIMINARY PAPERS 1999 (New Zealand Law Comm’n, NZLC 
PP37, 1999); Warren Young, Yvette Tinsley & Neil Cameron, The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Jury Decision-Making, 
24 CRIM. L.J. 89 (2000); Michael Zander & Paul Henderson, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CROWN 
COURT STUDY (HMSO 1993). 
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compared to jurors from juries that imposed the death penalty, jurors from juries that imposed life 
sentences reported more impatience with deliberations and a stronger sense that the jury failed to 
follow the judge’s instructions.34 
Interviews have also been used to learn how jurors’ subjective experiences vary with 
their demographics or jury composition.  Professor Marder analyzed questionnaire responses of 
jurors who had served in criminal trials to examine how gender, age, and racial diversity affected 
deliberations.35  She found that gender diversity was associated with reports of reduced hostility, 
greater support among jurors, and the perception that deliberations were thorough; racial 
diversity, however, was not related to these outcomes.36  Researchers from the Capital Jury 
Project used interview data to conclude that Black jurors tended to perceive their White 
counterparts as predisposed toward the death penalty and indifferent to mitigating evidence,37 
whereas members of all-White juries reported more unity and consensus.38 
How reliable are assessments of subjective experience?  On the one hand, these 
questions are well within the limits of jurors’ cognitive ability in that they do not require 
reconstruction of complex past events or analysis of higher-order mental processes.  On the other 
hand, threats to their validity clearly exist.  Jurors may be motivated to portray themselves in a 
certain light—unwilling, for example, to admit that they were confused by the judge’s 
instructions.  The passage of time may also color perceptions; upon post-trial reflection, jurors 
may grow increasingly confident or doubtful about their jury’s verdict.  Although self-report is 
the most straightforward way to assess subjective reactions to jury service, there are no guarantees 
that reports of subjective experiences are accurate.  At the very least, researchers should think 
carefully about the cognitive and motivational factors that might distort responses and look for 
ways to counteract—or at least to assess—them.  Likewise, policymakers interested in reforming 
aspects of jury service to improve the experience for jurors should consider such issues in 
attempting to draw conclusions from this research. 
B.   Which Juror Characteristics Predict Trial Perceptions and Votes? 
Another frequent objective of juror interview studies is to find out how different kinds of 
people decide different kinds of cases by asking jurors how they voted during deliberations.  
Usually jurors are asked to recall not just their final vote, but also preliminary votes cast during 
the course of deliberations.39  Other studies have examined the relation between jurors’ general 
                                                                
34 Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (1993). 
35 Marder, supra note 32, at 681, 682. 
36 Id. at 692-93, 697-98. 
37 Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death Sentencing, supra note 29, at 244. 
38 Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31, at 1525. 
39 See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, 
Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 279 (2001) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Garvey & 
Wells, Forecasting Life and Death] (examining how certain juror characteristics may influence a juror’s first vote in 
capital cases); Stephen P. Garvey, et al., Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 373-74 
(2004) (controlling for the influence of the majority on the final vote by asking for jurors’ first votes); Carol J. Mills & 
Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What Extent Are They Related to Jury Verdicts? 64 JUDICATURE 23, 24 
(1980); John P. Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and Verdict Trends, 45 SOUTHWESTERN SOC. SCI. Q. 361, 366-67 
(1965); Marla Sandys & R. C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury 
Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 178 (1995); Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 
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legal attitudes and their voting tendencies.40  For example, Capital Jury Project (“CJP”) jurors’ 
belief that death is generally the right punishment for murder predicted both their first and final 
votes for death.41  Other studies have asked jurors their opinions on topics such as defendants’ 
rights,42 the civil tort system,43 and whether they consider themselves “tough on crime.”44 
Of course, the data obtained in these studies are only as reliable as the voting history 
recollections on which they are based.  As alluded to above, one concern is that the longer the 
time between deliberation and interview, the more likely it is that random memory error and 
systematic bias (e.g., recollections of initial votes becoming skewed in the direction of the final 
verdict) will emerge.  This is particularly the case when jurors are asked to recall several votes 
over the course of a long deliberation.  Clearly, passage of time is a factor that should be 
considered when evaluating responses. 
Answers to questions about general legal attitudes may also be influenced by concerns 
about self-presentation.  Jurors may avoid admitting beliefs that they consider unpopular, 
especially if interviewed in public or by an authority figure such as a judge.  A less obvious threat 
to validity is the assumption that general legal attitudes are stable and unaffected by recent trial 
experiences.45  When a juror states that she opposes the three-strikes law, for example, a 
researcher may assume that she had this attitude before she was called for jury service.  However, 
attitudes reported after jury service may have been influenced by the trial and deliberation.  This 
is particularly likely when the topic is unfamiliar: someone who has never thought much about 
punitive damages may develop strong opinions on this subject during a tort trial.  Thus, jurors’ 
post-trial reports of attitudes may represent pre-existing opinions that influenced deliberations, or 
they may reflect ideas that developed during the trial itself.  Typically, the interviewer has no way 
to distinguish between these possibilities.  Researchers who see this as a potential problem for the 
attitudes they want to measure should look for ways to assess these attitudes before the trial. 
                                                                 
11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13-14 (1987). 
40 See Gary Moran & John C. Comfort, Scientific Juror Selection: Sex as a Moderator of Demographic and 
Personality Predictors of Impaneled Felony Juror Behavior, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1052, 1058 (1982); 
Gary Moran & John C. Comfort, Neither “Tentative” Nor “Fragmentary”: Verdict Preference of Impaneled Felony 
Jurors as a Function of Attitude Toward Capital Punishment, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 146, 147-48 (1986) (examining 
multiple studies on the correlation between jurors’ attitudes on capital punishment and the verdict). 
41 Eisenberg, Garvey & Wells, Forecasting Life and Death, supra note 39, at 308.  See also William J. 
Bowers, Marla Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors’ Predispositions, 
Guilt Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1474, 1512-14 (1998) [hereinafter Bowers, 
Sandys & Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality]. 
42 See Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content and Effect, 18 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 487, 498 (1994) (noting how jurors who had been allowed to serve still had attitudes directly against the 
presumption of innocence); Richard Seltzer, Mark A. Venuti & Grace M. Lopes, Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 
J. CRIM. JUST. 451, 457-58 (1991) (revealing that jurors did not respond during voir dire to attitudinal questions such as 
whether the defendant bears the burden of proof). 
43 See Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1497, 1507-08 (2003) (debunking claims that juries are pro-plaintiff and anti-business). 
44 Visher, supra note 39, at 9. 
45 E.g., Virginia R. Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personality: An 
Application of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 734, 742; David A. 
Kravitz, Brian L. Cutler & Petra Brock, Reliability and Validity of the Original and Revised Legal Attitudes 
Questionnaire, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 661, 663 (1993) (dealing with this issue by administering their Legal Attitudes 
Questionnaire before presenting students with a murder case). 
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C.   What Do Jurors Cite as Important to Their Decisions? 
Researchers have often sought to identify the factors that influenced jurors’ decisions.46  
One way to do this is to ask jurors for unconstrained, open-ended narrative accounts of their 
experience.47  This method can reveal information that the researcher would never have thought to 
seek.  For example, in the CJP interviews, a White juror reported that the jury feared that the 
Black defendant’s family would retaliate if they voted for a death sentence, prompting jurors to 
ask for a court escort to their cars after the verdict.  Another White juror mentioned that two 
Black men stood at the back of the courtroom during trial, which she interpreted as an attempt to 
communicate to the Black jurors that they should stand by the Black defendant because of their 
shared race.48 
Another way that researchers have sought to identify influential factors has been to ask 
jurors about specific aspects of the case.49  For example, National Center for State Courts 
(“NCSC”) interviews revealed that post-trial doubts about police officers’ credibility were 
associated with votes for acquittal.50  Many researchers have been particularly interested in jurors’ 
responses to expert witnesses.51  As one example, Professor Sundby analyzed CJP interviews and 
concluded that experts are most persuasive when their testimony helps provide a context for the 
evidence presented by other witnesses.52 
                                                                 
46 See, e.g., Samples, supra note 6 (stating that “Certainly, the most important questions focus on the 
decision criteria utilized by the panel and the group interaction that influenced the verdict,” and, “Without question, the 
most important area of exploration with jurors is a thorough investigation of their personal, and the group’s, interaction 
and discussion as to how they arrived at a particular verdict.  Probing questions are utilized to understand the thinking and 
reasoning behind the various elements that lead to the verdict.  These findings are critical to similar trials that litigators 
may face in the future.”). 
47 See, e.g., Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Narratives of the Death Sentence: Toward a Theory of Legal 
Narrativity, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 553 (2002) (asking open-ended questions to see what legal or extra-legal factors 
affected jurors’ decisions). 
48 Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31, at 1532; see also BRYAN C. EDELMAN, RACIAL PREJUDICE, 
JUROR EMPATHY, AND SENTENCING IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2006); Garvey, supra note 3. 
49 See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000) 
(interviewing jurors about their responses to parties and evidence).  See generally Michael E. Antonio & Nicole E. Arone, 
Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don’t: Jurors’ Reaction to Defendant Testimony or Silence During a Capital Trial, 
89 JUDICATURE 60 (2005) (reviewing interviews with CJP jurors about the inferences they drew from a defendant’s failure 
to testify as well as their perceptions of defendants who did testify); Thomas W. Brewer, The Attorney-Client Relationship 
in Capital Cases and its Impact on Juror Receptivity to Mitigation Evidence, 22 JUST. Q. 340 (2005) (using interviews 
with 725 capital jurors to assess how jurors’ perception of the attorney-client relationship affects their willingness to 
consider mitigation evidence). 
50 Garvey et al., supra note 39, at 396. 
51 See generally Diane L. Bridgeman & David Marlowe, Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Study Based 
on Actual Felony Trials, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 91, 95 (1979) (finding that jurors placed little importance on the 
testimony of experts relative to the testimony of police, the defendant and other witnesses); Shari Seidman Diamond & 
Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 513 (1992); Michael J. Saks & Roselle L. Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testimony 
Surveys of the Law and of Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 435 (1984) (interviewing individuals for their assessments of the 
relative credibility of different kinds of experts, such as doctors, lab experts, and accountants). 
52 Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay 
Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1176-77 (1997).  See generally John H. Montgomery, J. Richard Ciccone, Stephen P. 
Garvey & Theodore Eisenberg, Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 
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Other researchers have attempted to find out how the topics discussed during jury 
deliberations influenced verdicts.53  For instance, one study found that eighty-five percent of 
jurors said that they discussed attorney fees when calculating damages, even though they had 
been instructed not to.54  In the criminal context, CJP interviews have revealed a number of topics 
common to death penalty deliberations.  The defendant’s remorse55 and future dangerousness56 
were among the most frequently discussed issues during penalty deliberations, as was the victim’s 
character and role in crime.57  On the other hand, jurors reported that they tended to neglect 
mitigating factors during penalty phase discussions, as they saw such evidence not as providing a 
context in which to evaluate the crime, but rather as an attempt to excuse it.58 
Finally, in an effort to understand how jurors reached their decisions, some researchers 
have simply asked them directly.59  For example, Professors Ivkovich and Hans asked jurors 
                                                                 
& L. 509 (2005) (concluding that psychiatric expert testimony was important in affecting jurors’ view of mental illness as 
a mitigating factor but not so impactful on jurors’ view of defendant’s future dangerousness in capital cases). 
53 Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31, at 1500 (examining how race of jury and defendant influences 
the verdict).  See generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Jonathan D. Casper, Carnie L. Heiert & Anna-Maria Marshall, 
Criminology: Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996) (using simulations of jury 
service to determine reactions to attorneys’ performance during deliberations); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and 
Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, CORNELL L. REV. 343, 344 (2003) (studying how victims’ 
characteristics influence the jury’s decision in capital cases); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, 
Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306 (2003) 
(examining the relationship between victim impact evidence, perceived victim admirability and the effect of victim 
admirability on juries imposing death sentences). 
54 Nicole L. Mott, Valerie P. Hans & Lindsay Simpson, What’s Half A Lung Worth? Civil Jurors’ Accounts 
of Their Award Decision Making, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 401, 410 (2000). 
55 See generally Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, 
Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998) (examining how juries use defendant’s remorse in 
deciding between the death penalty and a life sentence); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, But 
Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998) (studying what factors the 
jurors use to assess defendant’s remorsefulness). 
56 See Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 
70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1131-32 (1995).  Sarat analyzed what jurors told interviewers about how they perceived their role in the 
process and what they thought a death sentence really meant.  Many jurors reported that they did not believe that the death 
penalty deterred, but they nevertheless supported it as a way to incapacitate offenders, especially when life without the 
possibility of parole was not a sentencing option.  See generally John H. Blume, Stephen P.  Garvey & Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always “At Issue,” 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 397-410 (2001); Sally 
Costanzo & Mark Costanzo, Life or Death Decisions: An Analysis of Capital Jury Decision Making Under the Special 
Issues Sentencing Framework, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1994) (determining that future dangerousness combined 
with the possibility of parole had a strong influence in deciding between life and death sentences); Eisenberg & Wells, 
supra note 34 (asserting that future dangerousness is on the minds of most jurors without the help of the prosecutor). 
57 Sundby, supra note 52. 
58 Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation 
Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1013, 1042 (2001). 
59 See e.g., Bridgeman & Marlowe, supra note 51, at 91 (interviewing sixty-five jurors who served in felony 
trials to examine the relationship between jury characteristics and decision-making); Eisenberg, Garvey & Wells, Jury 
Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, supra note 30, at 340 (interviewing 153 jurors in South Carolina capital cases to 
examine whether capital sentencing jurors assume responsibility for the sentences imposed); Valerie P. Hans & William S. 
Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications For The Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 
LAW & SOC’Y REV 85, 92 (1992) (analyzing interviews regarding jurors’ reactions to parties and evidence in business 
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about the impact of expert witness testimony.  Jurors claimed to have evaluated experts’ 
credentials and motives, as well as the content and presentation style of their testimony.60  In a 
criminal setting, researchers asked jurors whether they considered a defendant’s criminal record 
in assessing guilt.  Some jurors responded that although other members of their jury mentioned 
the defendant’s known or suspected criminal history, it did not ultimately affect the jury’s 
decision.61  Professors Geimer and Amsterdam interviewed jurors in ten Florida capital cases 
about the reasons for their decisions.  Jurors who voted for a life sentence cited lingering doubt 
about guilt as the most important factor in their decision.62  Several jurors also said that their 
knowledge that the trial judge could override their recommendation made them more willing to 
vote for death.63 
How useful are juror interviews for identifying the factors that influence jurors’ 
decisions?  Open-ended narrative accounts like those used in the CJP study have revealed 
unexpected factors that the researchers had not thought of, and that are, thus, enormously 
valuable.  The limitations of responses to more specific questions are similar to those for 
assessment of subjective emotional experiences.  Jurors’ evaluations of particular aspects of the 
trial may be colored by the experience of deliberation and the passage of time.  For instance, it 
may be difficult to distinguish between jurors’ perceptions of a witness’s credibility at the time of 
the trial and their current, post-trial assessment.  Jurors may be motivated to communicate that 
their decisions were based on the evidence, as opposed to the emotions or illegitimate 
considerations that actually influenced them.  Thus, when jurors do admit to being swayed by 
fear, influenced by impermissible information, or to making their minds up before the end of the 
case, their responses are more trustworthy than when they say they decided based on “the strength 
of the evidence.” 
Most problematic are questions that require jurors to estimate the extent to which 
particular elements of the case affected their judgment.  The utility of such questions depends on 
respondents’ honesty and ability to remember not just a single fact (such as their vote) or a series 
of events (such as topics of deliberation), but also to analyze their decision process and infer the 
factors that influenced it.  Given the dubious accessibility of such information, these questions 
                                                                 
liability cases); Matthews et al., supra note 31; John E. B. Myers et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 393 (1999) (analyzing interviews regarding jurors’ reactions to evidence 
in child abuse cases); Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal Factors in Jurors’ 
Decisions, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 423, 424-25 (1986) (analyzing interviews regarding jurors’ background, evidence, and 
response to verdict to discover the impact of evidence and extralegal factors).  See generally Young, Tinsley & Cameron, 
supra note 33 (interviewing jurors and judges to research jury decision-making in criminal cases in New Zealand); Ann 
Burnett Pettus, The Verdict Is In: A Study of Jury Decision Making Factors, Moment of Personal Decision, and Jury 
Deliberations—From the Jurors’ Point of View, 38 COMMUNICATION Q. 83 (1990). 
60 Sanja Kutjnak Ivkovich & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors and Experts, 16 ADVOC. MAG. DEL. TRIAL L. 17, 18 
(1994).  See generally Anthony Champagne, Daniel W. Shuman & Elizabeth Whitaker, An Empirical Examination of the 
Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 379 (1991); Daniel W. Shuman, Anthony 
Champagne & Elizabeth Whitaker, Assessing the Believability of Expert Witnesses: Science in the Jury Box, 37 
JURIMETRICS J. 23 (1996) (arguing that jurors make expert-specific decisions based on a rational set of criteria). 
61 Young, Cameron & Tinsley, supra note 33, at 43-44. 
62 William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten 
Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4 n.11 (1988); see also Bowers, Sandys & Steiner, Foreclosed 
Impartiality; supra note 41, at 1534-36. 
63 Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 62, at 8.  See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation 
in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1998). 
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regarding higher-order cognitive processes are problematic.64  Even if obstacles such as memory 
decay, biasing post-event information, and self-presentational concerns are overcome, jurors may 
simply be unable to provide accurate insight into why they made the decision they did.65 
D.   How Does the Deliberation Process Work? 
Interviews have been used not only to investigate individual jurors’ decision-making, but 
also to examine the process of jury deliberation.  Researchers sometimes explicitly ask jurors to 
evaluate their jury’s deliberations66 or to report on their interactions with fellow jurors.67  For 
example, one study found that most civil jurors formed at least a tentative opinion about the 
verdict before receiving jury instructions, with almost half admitting that they had made up their 
minds by that point.68  CJP researchers observed similar evidence of early judgment, as many 
jurors admitted making up their minds about the penalty before the end of the guilt phase of the 
trial and before hearing any evidence regarding aggravation and mitigation.69 
At first blush, questions about the course of the deliberations do not seem particularly 
problematic.  After all, like recollection of personal voting history, reporting the topics of 
deliberation discussions involves memory for specific facts.  But unlike votes, discussions are not 
discrete events and, therefore, are more susceptible to inaccuracies in memory.  Most interview 
questions about deliberations not only ask which topics were raised, but also how extensively they 
were discussed.  Such questions require jurors to reconstruct the deliberation process, a more 
challenging task than remembering a handful of discrete events.  Add to this the likelihood that 
jurors are influenced by self-presentational concerns—such as reluctance to admit that they failed 
to consider a significant issue or were biased by race—and the utility of such questions becomes 
more questionable, particularly when the research objective is to determine whether jurors did 
something they were not supposed to do. 
E.   How Good is Juror Comprehension? 
Some interviews have focused on juror comprehension, often regarding technical or 
scientific evidence, and often in complex civil cases.70  As an example, Professor Sanders 
                                                                 
64 See generally Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 17 (explaining that the accuracy of cognitive processes are 
determined by the saliency and plausibility of the stimuli). 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31, at 1500 (examining the impact of racial composition 
of a jury on the decision through juror evaluations); Marder, supra note 32, at 662-63 (considering the implications of 
more culturally diverse juries and how the concept connects with a jury’s reasonableness standard). 
67 Young, Tinsley & Cameron, supra note 33, at 28. 
68 Hannaford et al., supra note 16, at 636-37. 
69 Bowers, Sandys & Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality, supra note 41, at 1477; see also Marla Sandys, 
Cross-Overs: Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 
IND. L. J. 1183, 1191 (1995). 
70 See, e.g., ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY 55, 
63 (1984) (interviewing two sets of jurors in a complex antitrust suit and finding that jurors had a great deal of difficulty 
with the concepts involved and the poor language of the instructions); Harold M. Hoffman & Joseph Brodley, Jurors on 
Trial, 17 MO. L. REV. 235, 250 (1952) (revealing from juror interviews that jurors misunderstand a variety of aspects of 
trial).  See also Paul Rosenthal, Nature of Jury Response to the Expert Witness, 28 J. FORENSIC SCI. 528-31 (1983) 
(discussing a case where jurors based decisions on expert witness’ appearance when they did not comprehend voiceprint 
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interviewed jurors in a Bendectin case and found that many of them did not understand the 
complex evidence about the cause of plaintiffs’ birth defects.71 
Jurors’ responses to interview questions have also been interpreted as indicating 
misunderstandings of the law.  For instance, researchers have asked jurors whether they made up 
their minds before the court’s instructions,72 how they perceived extralegal factors,73 and whether 
they understood that criminal defendants are presumed innocent.74  In another study, 
psychologists surveyed jurors who served on civil and criminal trials to test their understanding of 
both procedural and substantive legal issues.  They found that jurors understood fewer than half of 
the judge’s instructions and those who asked for the judge’s help during deliberations showed 
better comprehension than those who did not.75  Studies such as these identify particular 
shortcomings of the jury system and suggest possibilities for improving jurors’ understanding of 
the law.76 
                                                                 
identification-technological evidence); MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, INST. CIV. JUST., THE DEBATE OVER JURY 
PERFORMANCE (1987) (researching jury behavior in tort liability claims). 
71 See generally Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45 (1993) (evaluating Havner, a case where the jury had difficulties understanding the 
scientific evidence presented by expert witnesses); see also Special Comm. A.B.A. Sec. Litig., Jury Comprehension in 
Complex Cases, 1989. 
72 Hannaford, et al., supra note 16, at 636-38; Valerie P. Hans & Krista Sweigart, Jurors’ Views of Civil 
Lawyers: Implications for Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L. J. 1297, 1304 (1993) (analyzing jurors and mock jurors 
to determine if they remained neutral after opening statements and prior to closing arguments and arguing that in initially 
deciding criminal cases, jurors focus on evidence, with limited influence by personal attitude or demographics, among 
other factors). 
73 Reskin & Visher, supra note 59, at 423-24 (examining how evidence and extralegal variables influenced 
jurors in sexual assault trials). 
74 Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Defendant and the Presumption of Innocence: In the 
Hands of Real Juror, Is Either of Them Safe?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 248-52 (2006). 
75 Alan Reifman, Spencer M. Gusick & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law in 
Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539, 539 (1992); see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & 
Sven Smith, Juror Questions During Trial: A Window Into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927 (2006) (arguing that 
jurors used questioning to supplement and deepen understanding of evidence). 
76 See Bowers, supra note 29, at 1044 (studying how capital jurors make their life or death sentencing 
decisions and how the juridical system is still criticized for some arbitrariness).  See generally William J. Bowers & 
Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 605 (1999) (examining whether capital jurors should know prisoner parole timelines and whether jurors 
can make a reasonable decision regarding punishment without such information); Shari Seidman Diamond & J. N. Levi, 
Improving Decisions on Death By Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996) (arguing that the 
instructions that jurors receive in some capital cases do not provide adequate guidance, and deliberations cannot be relied 
on to cure juror miscomprehensions); Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 34, at 2 (arguing that jurors are often improperly 
instructed in murder trials, which leads to initial inclination to sentence to death); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. 
Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension 
Project, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 401, 406 (1990) (surveying Michigan judges to identify possible weaknesses in 
criminal jury instructions leading to juror confusion).  See generally Craig Haney, Lorelei Sontag & Sally Constanzo, 
Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudence of Death, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 149 
(1994) (analyzing interviews with jurors in two states with different sentencing frameworks to determine how capital 
sentencing instructions, a juror’s interpretation of evidence, and conceptions of the juror’s task alter decision-making 
process); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. 
L. J. 1161 (1995) (arguing that improving judicial instruction to jurors in capital punishment cases can decrease influence 
by erroneous perception of law); Reifman et al., supra note 75; Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury 
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More generally, interviews have shed light on jurors’ beliefs about their role in the trial 
process, some of which are consistent with legal requirements, some of which are not.  For 
example, in a study of civil juries, many jurors expressed an ethic of individual responsibility, 
seeing themselves as guardians against frivolous lawsuits.77  However, jurors may also talk about 
their experiences in a way that clearly demonstrates that they did not fully understand their role.  
For instance, CJP researchers found that many capital jurors erroneously believed that they were 
merely making a recommendation to the judge, who was the ultimate decision maker.78 
The value of interviews for assessing jurors’ comprehension of the case, the law, and 
their own role varies depending on the strategy adopted by researchers.  Questions that require 
jurors to evaluate their own comprehension are unlikely to yield informative responses: jurors 
may be unwilling to admit that the testimony or the law confused them or may not realize that 
they failed to grasp important issues.  However, interviews can be extremely useful for 
understanding juror comprehension when jurors are asked directly about the law or complex 
evidence, allowing for later assessment of accuracy.  If jurors describe complex testimony, their 
recollections can be compared to the trial transcript; jurors’ responses to questions about the law 
can be compared to the judge’s instructions.  In this manner, questioning jurors about what the 
law or the evidence says is an excellent way to measure comprehension.  In short, testing actual 
understanding is far more accurate and informative than simply asking jurors how well they 
understood. 
F.   How Well is the Legal Process Functioning? 
Juror interviews have also been used to evaluate other aspects of the trial process.  For 
example, in interviews conducted by the NCSC, jurors who served on deadlocked juries described 
concerns both about the fairness of the law and legal process generally, and about the adequacy of 
the evidence presented in their specific cases.79  Interview studies have also assessed the 
effectiveness of voir dire for identifying biased jurors who nevertheless survived the jury 
                                                                 
Instructions? A Field Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998) (arguing 
for improvement of jury instruction practices in Wyoming); Benjamin D. Steiner, William J. Bowers & Austin Sarat, Folk 
Knowledge as Legal Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and 
Punitiveness, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461 (1999) (arguing that individual perception influences jury deliberation in capital 
punishment cases despite court admonitions); Young, Tinsley & Cameron, supra note 33, at 97-98; Zander & Henderson, 
supra note 33. 
77 Hans & Albertson, supra note 43, at 1498; see also Hans & Lofquist, supra note 59, at 86 (discussing 
coverage of civil juries as overcompensating plaintiff’s claiming negligence even when the claim is questionable); Young, 
Tinsley & Cameron, supra note 33. 
78 Hoffman, supra note 30 (arguing that many capital case jurors avoid personal moral responsibility for jury 
death penalty decisions); see also Bentele et al., supra note 58, at 1013 (discussing diminished responsibility among jurors 
in death sentence cases and its unconstitutionality); William J. Bowers, Wanda D. Foglia, Jean E. Giles & Michael E. 
Antonio, The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of the Way The Role of the Judge and the Jury 
Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1010 (2006); Eisenberg, Garvey & Wells, Jury 
Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, supra note 30, at 341 (arguing that some jurors do not believe they are causally 
responsibility for death sentences and do not believe that most death sentences will be carried out).  See generally Wanda 
D. Foglia, They Know Not What They Do: Unguided and Misguided Discretion in Pennsylvania Capital Cases, 20 JUST. 
Q. 187 (2003). 
79 Hannaford-Agor & Hans, Nullification at Work, supra note 29, at 1276-77. 
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selection process.80  One study found that many jurors lied during voir dire—failing to disclose, 
for instance, that they or a family member had been the victim of a crime.81 
Interviews have also been used to study procedural changes.  One such study tested the 
effects of an Arizona rule allowing jurors to discuss evidence before deliberations.  This change 
did not affect the level of agreement between judges and juries, but juror interviews revealed that 
pre-deliberation discussion increased the perceived conflict on the jury, as well jurors’ certainty 
about their pre-deliberation verdict preference.82  However, the same cautions regarding the 
examination of juror comprehension apply to the assessment of procedural changes: it is more 
informative to combine interview data with other evidence about the effectiveness of new 
procedures than it is to rely on jurors’ own evaluations of these changes. 
For instance, psychologists Heuer and Penrod reported that although jurors who received 
written judicial instructions reported that they were helpful, their actual understanding of the law 
did not improve.83  Researchers Young, Cameron, and Tinsley did not directly test jurors’ 
comprehension, but their post-trial interviews suggested that jurors believed that they understood 
the law better than they actually did.84  Although more than eighty-five percent of jurors reported 
finding the judge’s instructions clear, the researchers found evidence of fundamental 
misunderstandings of the relevant law in thirty-five of the forty-eight trials.85  Similarly, jurors 
allowed to take notes during trial reported greater satisfaction,86 but their understanding of the law 
was no better than that of their counterparts, who had to rely on their memories alone.87 
                                                                 
80 Johnson et al., supra note 42, at 487 (researching the use of voir dire in felony trials and addressing 
criticisms, including that it fails to eliminate prejudice of jurors); see also Dennis J. Devine, Kristi M. Olafson, LaRita L. 
Jarvis, Jennifer P. Bott, Laura D. Clayton & Jami M. T. Wolfe, Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real?, 34 J. 
OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2069 (2004) (using post-trial questionnaires to test whether initial votes predicted final 
verdicts). 
81 Seltzer et al., supra note 42, at 455; see also Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective 
Procedure for the Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 708 (1991); Norbert L. Kerr, Geoffrey P.  
Kramer, John S. Carroll & James J. Alfini, On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial 
Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 699 (1991) (commenting on jurors’ failure to disclose pre-litigation 
exposure to the case in the media); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral 
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 261 (2007). 
82 See generally Hannaford, Hans & Munsterman, Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial, supra note 29.  
See also Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis, & Beth Murphy, Juror Discussions During Civil 
Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 48 (2003); Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury 
Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001) (discussing the Arizona Jury Project that juxtaposed 
juries with pre-trial discussion from those without). 
83 Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and Preliminary 
Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 424 (1989) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Instructing Jurors]; cf. CECIL ET AL., 
supra note 33, at 30, 39 (finding that jurors reported certain instructions and procedures to have varying degrees of 
helpfulness but not conducting any research on jurors’ actual understanding of the law).  Contra Kramer & Koenig, supra 
note 76, at 428 (concluding that written jury instructions did improve juror comprehension). 
84 Young, Tinsley & Cameron, supra note 33, at 97-98. 
85 Id.; see also Zander & Henderson, supra note 33, at 216-17. 
86 Along similar lines, Sand and Reis found that seven of twelve jurors they interviewed stated that their 
notes helped them to remember facts and to keep track of exhibits.  Leonard B. Sand & Steven A. Reiss, A Report On 
Seven Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 450 (1985). 
87 Heuer & Penrod, Instructing Jurors, supra note 83, at 411; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ 
Participation in Trials, supra note 33, at 245-46. 
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G.   Summary 
Juror interviews have been used to address a range of empirical questions about civil, 
criminal, and capital jury decision-making.  For some research objectives, it is difficult to 
conceive of methods that do not involve self-report measures; other questions are more clearly 
amenable to archival or observational analysis.  Many research objectives are compromised to 
some degree by the limitations of self-report data, such as the malleability of human memory, 
systematic bias in social judgment, the inherent difficulty of analyzing one’s own complex 
cognitive processes, and concerns with self-presentation.  However, the extent and precise nature 
of these threats to validity depend on the empirical questions under investigation and the kinds of 
answers respondents are asked to provide.  To illustrate this point and to provide a more concrete 
synthesis of the conclusions above, we now examine more closely one particular research area: 
the influence of race on juror decision-making. 
III.  CASE STUDY: RACE AND JUROR DECISION-MAKING 
Studying the role of race in legal decision-making poses a number of challenges, in large 
part because the effects of race on judgment are often subtle and even unconscious.88  In addition, 
jurors’ concerns about self-presentation are likely to be especially acute when they are asked 
about race.89  Because of the variety of problems with self-report data in this domain, legal 
research on the influence of race serves as an illustrative example of the kind of situation where 
the juror interview method is especially risky.  We begin this section by comparing the findings of 
interview studies concerning race with the results of studies that have relied on behavioral data.  
We then compare these two types of data within the framework of a single study, describing self-
report and behavioral findings from a recent experimental investigation of the influence of the 
jury’s racial composition on deliberation processes.90 
A.  Juror Interview Studies Examining the Influence of Race 
Some studies that have relied on interviews with actual jurors have examined racial 
differences in self-reported satisfaction with the trial process.  Professors Antonio and Hans 
examined NCSC data and concluded that White jurors were more satisfied with their jury 
experiences than non-White jurors.91  CJP researcher Bowers and colleagues reported that Black 
                                                                 
88 For a discussion of the ways racial stereotypes can be activated without the perceiver realizing it, see 
Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 473 (D.T. 
Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
89 Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of 
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 599-600 (2006) [hereinafter 
Sommers, On Racial Diversity] (citing multiple studies that suggest that a focus on racial prejudice triggers jurors’ 
concerns about appearing racially biased such that the effect of jurors’ prejudice decreases); see Samuel R. Sommers & 
Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White Racists: What Constitutes Racism (And What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESSES 
& INTERGROUP RELATIONS 117, 118, 125 (2006) (finding that people hold lay theories of racism which allow them to 
distance themselves from the “racist” label). 
90 Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra note 89. 
91 Michael E. Antonio & Valerie P. Hans, Race and the Civil Jury: How Does a Juror’s Race Shape the Jury 
Experience?, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE COURTS: INTERNATIONAL ADVANCES IN KNOWLEDGE 69, 75 (Ronald Roesch et al., 
eds., 2001). 
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jurors were less confident than their White counterparts about the capital sentencing process, and 
more concerned that their jury had made a mistake.92  In capital cases with Black defendants and 
White victims, Black jurors also said that they felt that the White jurors failed to understand Black 
defendants’ circumstances and relied on racial stereotypes in interpreting the evidence.93 
Only a few interview studies have tried to address the causal influence of race on jury 
decision-making, although many interview, archival, and observational studies have examined the 
correlation between race and legal perceptions or outcomes.  Professor Broeder interviewed jurors 
from four criminal trials with Black defendants, three of which ended in conviction, and found 
that several jurors who favored conviction expressed racial stereotypes during deliberations, and a 
few even suggested that the defendant’s race was grounds for conviction.94  In discussing the case 
with interviewers, some of the jurors made unsolicited prejudicial remarks about Blacks.95 
It seems unlikely that interviews conducted forty-five years later, in today’s more 
politically correct era, would produce evidence of racial prejudice anywhere near as blatant as that 
found by Broeder.96  Indeed, we know of no contemporary interview study that finds overt juror 
racial bias in response to direct questions.  More recent efforts to assess the influence of race 
using interview data have typically compared the responses of jurors who served in trials with 
White victims or defendants to the responses of jurors who served in trials with Black victims or 
defendants.  Sociologist LaFree found race effects in jurors’ perceptions of the alleged victim in 
sexual assault cases, with White jurors viewing Blacks as less credible than Whites;97 
psychologist Edelman reported similar findings for victim race in CJP cases, but found no effect 
for race of defendant.98  CJP researchers reported that White jurors in capital cases were more 
likely than Black jurors to say that Black defendants were dangerous, remorseless, and 
emotionally disturbed.99  Beyond this handful of studies, there are scant published interview data 
that provide evidence—direct or indirect—of the ways in which the race of trial principals 
influences jurors. 
Some researchers have examined the relation between the racial make-up of a jury and 
its decision-making.  For example, using CJP data Bowers and colleagues found that a 
predominance of White male jurors was associated with a sentence of death, and that the presence 
of Black males on the jury was strongly associated with the imposition of a life sentence.100  With 
                                                                 
92 Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31, at 1502. 
93 Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death Sentencing, supra note 29, at 244. 
94 Dale W. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 21-24, 28 (1965). 
95 Id. at 30. 
96 See id. 
97 GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 219-
20 (1989). 
98 EDELMAN, supra note 48, at 4-5, 59; see also Thomas W. Brewer, Race and Jurors’ Receptivity to 
Mitigation in Capital Cases: The Effect of Jurors’, Defendants’, and Victims’ Race in Combination, 28 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 529, 540-42 (2004) (finding that both Black and White jurors were more receptive to mitigation when the 
defendant was the same race as the juror and the victim was of a different race). 
99 Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision-Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 
171, 177-78 (2007) (citing Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31, at 1502-03); Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death 
Sentencing, supra note 29, at 257-58 (explaining that according to the CJP study, White jurors are less likely to mitigate 
because they may interpret Black defendants’ lack of emotion as remorselessness or expressions of remorse as deceptive). 
100 Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31, at 1501; see also Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death 
Sentencing, supra note 29, at 254-56 (describing juror experiences in which a Georgia jury had to “coach” a Black male 
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regard to how a jury’s composition affects its deliberation process, a traditional argument in favor 
of jury representativeness is that diverse juries will bring up a broader range of information and 
knowledge during deliberations than will homogeneous juries.101  Yet juror interview studies 
provide little to no empirical support for this proposition.  On the one hand, Professor Marder 
interviewed criminal jurors from Los Angeles and found no relation between jury racial 
composition and jurors’ ratings of the nature and scope of their deliberations.102  On the other 
hand, Bowers and colleagues found that all-White capital juries reported greater consensus during 
deliberations than did diverse juries.103  In sum, juror interview studies provide few and 
inconsistent empirical findings concerning traditional assumptions about the influence of jury 
racial composition on deliberations. 
B.   Behavioral Studies Examining the Influence of Race 
In contrast to the findings of interview studies, archival and observational studies using 
behavioral measures generally find that race does influence jury decision-making.104  A recent 
meta-analysis of thirty-four mock jury studies involving over 7,000 participants revealed a 
statistically significant association between defendants’ race and verdicts, with mock jurors less 
likely to vote to convict a same-race defendant than a defendant of a different race.105  Another 
meta-analysis of fourteen studies with over 2,800 participants produced similar conclusions 
regarding the sentencing decisions of White mock jurors.106  The race of a defendant has been 
found to influence not only mock verdicts, but also participants’ explanations for a defendant’s 
behavior,107 ratings of a defendant’s personality,108 susceptibility to bias from inadmissible 
evidence109 and pretrial publicity,110 and how deeply participants process information about a 
                                                                 
juror holdout to impose the death sentence and another case in which a Black male juror refused to impose the death 
sentence despite the other jurors’ hostility). 
101 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (The “exclusion [of a group] deprives the jury of a 
perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case.”); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve 
Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 205-06 (1989); see Sommers, Race and the Decision-Making 
of Juries, supra note 99, at 180-81 (claiming that jury diversity is one possible explanation for the causal link between a 
jury’s racial composition and its final decision). 
102 Marder, supra note 32, at 694, 699, 711 (finding that racial and age diversity had no effect on jurors’ 
reported thoroughness, hostility, or unanimity of deliberations). 
103 Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31, at 1519. 
104 Sommers, Race and the Decision-Making of Juries, supra note 99, at 174, 180, 183. 
105 Tara L. Mitchell, Ryann M. Haw, Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & Christian A. Meissner, Racial Bias in Mock Juror 
Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 625, 627 (2005). 
106 Laura T. Sweeney & Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179, 190-91 (1992). 
107 Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and 
Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1368 (2000) [hereinafter Sommers & 
Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom]. 
108 See, e.g., Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Black Jurors’ Personality Trait Attribution to a Rape Case 
Defendant, 4 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 193, 194 (1976) (presenting simulated studies about the influence of race of 
the defendant on Black jurors in rape cases). 
109 See, e.g., James D. Johnson, Erik Whitestone, Lee Anderson Jackson & Leslie Gatto, Justice is Still Not 
Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
893, 893 (1995) (presenting studies on how inadmissible evidence impacts the verdict in simulated criminal trials where 
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case.111 
Fewer observational experiments have focused on the racial composition of juries, but 
these studies provide consistent evidence of the influence of race, too.  Several simulation studies 
have concluded that the higher the percentage of Whites on a jury, the more likely the jury is to 
convict a Black or Latino defendant.112  In fact, one study indicated that even the expectation of 
deliberating as part of a mixed-race jury can influence mock jurors’ judgments.113  These findings 
are consistent with analyses of actual jury outcomes, which also demonstrate a relation between 
jury demographics and verdicts.114 
In a behavioral study that explicitly addressed the relation between mock jury racial 
composition and deliberation content, Sommers compared the deliberations of all White to 
racially diverse mock juries.115  Most of these jurors were recruited at a local courthouse during 
their actual jury duty.116  Participants were randomly assigned to six-person mock juries, half of 
which were all White and half of which were racially diverse (four White and two Black 
jurors).117  All juries watched the same video summary of a real sexual assault case involving a 
                                                                 
the defendant is Black versus where the defendant is White). 
110 See, e.g., Steven Fein, Seth J. Morgan, Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Hype and Suspicion: 
The Effects of Pretrial Publicity, Race, and Suspicion on Jurors’ Verdicts, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES 487, 487 (1997) (presenting 
studies on the impact of pretrial publicity on mock jury verdicts and how verdicts differed based on similar or dissimilar 
race of juror and defendant). 
111 See, e.g., Michael J. Sargent & Amy L. Bradfield, Race and Information Processing in Criminal Trials: 
Does the Defendant’s Race Affect How the Facts Are Evaluated?, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 995, 995 
(2004) (presenting studies concluding that a Black defendant can elicit more sensitivity to legally relevant facts than a 
White defendant). 
112 See J. L. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and that of Jurors in Determining 
Verdicts, 5 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 109 (1979) (finding a shift from ‘guilty’ to ‘not guilty’ verdicts between first 
ballots decided alone and final ballots decided with other jurors); Jack P. Lipton, Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic 
Defendant, 5 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 275, 282 (1983) (finding that Anglo jurors were more likely to shift their decision 
towards innocence if the jury was predominantly Chicano while Chicano jurors were more likely to shift their decision 
towards guilt if the jury was predominantly White); Delores A. Perez, Harmon M. Hosch, Bruce Ponder & Gloria Chanez 
Trejo, Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1249 (1993) 
(concluding that majority White juries were more lenient with White defendants than Hispanic defendants). 
113 See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr, Robert W. Hymes, Alonzo B. Anderson & James E. Weathers, Defendant-
Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 545, 560 (1995) (finding, for example, that mock 
jurors will judge another ingroup member more harshly than an outgroup member when they anticipate that most of the 
jury will be composed of outgroup members). 
114 David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner & Barbara Broffitt, The Use 
of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 18 (2001) 
(citing studies that show a distinct relationship between the probability of conviction and the number of Black jurors); 
Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death Sentencing, supra note 29, at 193 (finding, for example, that the dominance of White 
male jurors is strongly associated with the imposition of a death sentence in Black defendant/White victim cases, and the 
presence of Black male jurors is strongly associated with the imposition of a life sentence in Black defendant/White victim 
cases).  See generally Bowers, Sandys & Brewer, supra note 31; Howard C. Daudistel, Harmon M. Hosch, Malcolm D. 
Holmes & Joseph B. Graves, Effects of Defendant Ethnicity on Juries’ Dispositions of Felony Cases, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 317 (1999). 
115 See generally Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra note 89. 
116 Id. at 602. 
117 Id. at 601. 
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Black defendant and a White victim and deliberated as a group.118  These deliberations were 
video-recorded, allowing for a subsequent comparison of jurors’ actual behavior with their 
responses on post-deliberation questionnaires.119  Sommers reported that the deliberations of 
diverse juries were longer, covered more of the evidence, and were more factually accurate than 
those of all White juries, consistent with traditional assumptions about jury racial composition.120  
Interestingly, these effects were not wholly attributable to the contributions of the Black jurors; 
White jurors were more thorough and accurate in their discussion of the trial evidence (and more 
willing to discuss controversial race-related issues such as profiling) when they deliberated on 
diverse juries.121  Below, we offer previously unpublished analyses of the findings of this study to 
illustrate the types of research questions amenable to self-report, and those that are less so. 
C.  Comparing Interview and Behavioral Studies 
Our literature review suggests that behavioral studies are more likely than interview 
studies to provide evidence of the influence of race on jury decision-making.  There are several 
possible explanations for this disparity.  Many behavioral studies examine mock jurors, not actual 
jurors.  Of course, mock jurors render judgments that have no real consequences, unlike the 
decisions of actual jurors; perhaps race is more likely to be influential in a simulation because the 
stakes are lower than those in an actual trial.  However, archival data regarding race and actual 
juror judgments parallel the findings of the mock jury experiments, suggesting that race 
influences real juries as well.122 
Another possible explanation is that juror interview studies are less able than behavioral 
experiments to capture the influence of race on legal decision-making.  The best way to evaluate 
this possibility is to conduct research that includes both interview and behavioral measures.  
Sommers and Ellsworth presented groups of mock jurors with a summary of an assault case in 
which only the defendant’s race varied.123  When the incident in question was not racially 
charged, behavioral measures indicated that White mock jurors were influenced by the 
defendant’s race, voting to convict a Black more often than a White defendant.124  In unpublished 
pre-testing for this study, the researchers presented White participants with the same trial 
summary broken into five smaller passages.125  After each passage, participants were asked to 
describe the events in question and their current reactions to the case.126  Of the thirty-three 
Whites who took part in this pre-testing, only five (15%) mentioned race in their written 
responses.127  Breaking this result down even further, of the 165 written comments (five responses 
                                                                 
118 Id. at 601-02. 
119 Id. at 602. 
120 Id. at 604. 
121 Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra note 89, at 600. 
122 Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on 
Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993); Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know, supra note 7. 
123 Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 107, at 1369. 
124 Id. at 1374. 
125 Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpublished Pilot Study for Race in the Courtroom: 
Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions.  The data from the study are on file with the second author, to whom 
any questions can be directed. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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from each of thirty-three participants), only seven (4.2%) mentioned race.  In other words, even 
though behavioral data using the same trial summary indicated that Whites were significantly 
more likely to vote to convict the Black defendant than the White defendant, Whites almost never 
mentioned race in response to open-ended questions about the case. 
The Sommers deliberation study described above provides an even clearer comparison of 
discrepancies between interview and behavioral measures.128  The outcomes reported in the 
published Sommers paper were primarily behavioral, such as the number of case facts raised 
during deliberations and the number of inaccurate statements.129  However, analysis of 
unpublished data from the post-deliberation questionnaire allows for a comparison between 
participants’ self-reported perceptions of the deliberation process and the behaviors they actually 
exhibited while deliberating.130 
Which aspects of their experiences were mock jurors able to talk about most accurately?  
Perceptions of their own relative contributions to the deliberation process were reasonably 
accurate.  Mock jurors’ ratings of how active they were during deliberations were significantly 
correlated with the amount of time they actually spoke.131  That is, the more active jurors said they 
were during deliberations, the more active they actually were.  We also examined deliberation 
content by considering the forty-seven discrete evidentiary facts conveyed in the video trial.  
Jurors’ ratings of how active they were positively (though non-significantly) predicted the number 
of different trial facts they raised during deliberations.132 
In addition to self-assessment, jurors were reasonably accurate in their evaluations of 
other jurors’ participation.  One question asked them to rate the extent to which “one or two jurors 
dominated discussion.”  In analyzing the videotaped discussions, we identified domination where 
one juror talked for thirty-three percent or more of the total deliberation time or two jurors 
combined for fifty percent or more of the speaking time.  Analysis of self-reports indicated that 
jurors on juries that fit our dominance criteria perceived a greater amount of domination133 than 
did jurors on other juries.134 
Self-reported data proved less useful with regard to perceptions of personal influence 
over fellow jurors during deliberations.  Mock jurors were asked to rate the extent to which they 
influenced the other members of the jury, as well as the extent to which the other jurors 
influenced them.  Individual jurors’ ratings of their own influence on others were not reliably 
correlated with fellow jurors’ perceptions.135  It is not surprising that this comparison has less 
predictive utility, as these questions required participants to assess their own performance as well 
as to take the perspective of fellow jurors, thus inviting self-serving bias.  Jurors were also asked 
                                                                 
128 See generally Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra note 89. 
129 See id. 
130 For details regarding the data collection methods and data analyses of this study, see generally id.  As 
detailed therein, mock jurors in the study were jury-eligible citizens recruited in the midst of actual jury duty at a local 
courthouse.  Of course, given that it was a simulated trial, mock juries’ verdicts carried no real repercussions.  The 
implications of this aspect of the design, as well as the general nature of the juror- and jury-level results observed, are 
discussed in detail in this previous article.  The data from the study are on file with the second author, to whom any 
questions can be directed. 
131 Average group r (n = 28) = .47, p < .01 
132 Average r = .31, n.s. 
133 Average group M = 4.90 on a scale of 1-9. 
134 Average M = 3.74, t (26) = 2.52, p < .02 
135 Average r = .19, n.s. 
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to rate the extent to which they felt that they could speak their minds freely during deliberations, 
as well as the extent to which they believed their fellow jurors felt this way.  Participants’ ratings 
of their fellow jurors’ perceptions were actually negatively (though non-significantly) related to 
the ratings provided by those other jurors.136  Interestingly, jurors’ self-ratings for this measure 
were strong, positive predictors of their perceptions of other jurors’ feelings.137  In other words, 
jurors were unable to gauge how free fellow jurors felt to express their opinions, relying instead 
on the assumption that everyone else felt the way that they did.  Such overestimation of the extent 
to which others share one’s own viewpoint has been demonstrated for a wide range of social 
perceptions.138 
Jurors were quite poor at evaluating the extent to which their jury considered all possible 
perspectives during deliberations.139  We correlated these estimates with the amount of 
information actually discussed by each jury.  Information was categorized into four types: facts 
related to the assault itself, the victims’ identification of the defendant, forensic analyses 
conducted by police labs, and the judge’s instructions on the law.  Jurors’ ratings of the 
thoroughness of their jury’s deliberations were not correlated with three of these categories,140 and 
were only moderately (but non-significantly) correlated with the number of facts their jury 
considered regarding the victims’ eyewitness identification.141 
Another measure of the thoroughness of the deliberations was the extent to which juries 
discussed “missing” information, or evidence that they wished had been introduced at trial but 
was not (e.g., testimony from a child who witnessed part of one assault or fingerprint evidence).  
Jurors’ reports of deliberation thoroughness emerged as significant negative predictors of the 
tendency to discuss missing evidence.142  That is, the more thorough the jurors believed that the 
deliberations were, the less likely their jury was to have talked about the evidence they thought 
was missing from the prosecution’s case.  Moreover, self-reported deliberation breadth was a 
marginally significant negative predictor of the number of race-related conversations occurring on 
the jury.143  In other words, jurors’ assessments of the breadth of their deliberation discussions 
were typically no more accurate than chance, and on some dimensions, these ratings were actually 
inaccurate. 
Finally, jurors were asked two direct questions about the influence of race on their 
decision processes: they were asked to rate the extent to which the jury’s racial composition 
affected deliberations, and the extent to which “racial issues” influenced their decision-making in 
general.  Not surprisingly, jurors’ responses to these questions were at odds with the behavioral 
data.  Although there were substantial differences between the deliberations of all White and 
racially diverse juries,144 jurors rated their jury’s racial composition as largely non-influential,145 
                                                                 
136 Average r = –.28, n.s. 
137 Average r = .56, p < .01. 
138 See Lee Ross, David Greene & Pamela House, The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in 
Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977) (citing four studies 
demonstrating that social observers tend to perceive a “false consensus” with respect to the relative commonness of their 
own responses based on social inferences). 
139 See generally Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra note 89. 
140 Jury level rs < .08. 
141 r (n = 29) = .23, n.s. 
142 r (n = 29) = –.39, p < .04. 
143 r (n = 29) –.35, p = .07. 
144 See generally Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra note 89. 
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and responses to this question did not differ by jury composition.146  Jurors also disagreed with the 
proposition that racial issues influenced their decision-making.147  These responses did not differ 
by jury composition, nor by whether jurors had answered race-relevant or race-neutral pre-trial 
voir dire questions,148 a manipulation that had a significant impact on individual jurors’ pre-
deliberation verdict preferences. 
The interview and behavioral data from the Sommers study support the conclusion that 
juror interviews have limited value for identifying impact of race on legal decision-making.149  
Among other explanations, these limitations presumably derive from jurors’ lack of awareness of 
the effects of race, as well as self-presentational concerns about talking about race.150  Analysis of 
the Sommers study also illustrates some of the more general strengths and weaknesses of relying 
on jurors’ self-reports.151  Interview questions about factual recollections of juror participation 
during deliberations provided fairly accurate information.152  However, self-reports were less 
reliable for estimates of the influence jurors exerted on others and the scope of the jury’s 
deliberations.153  Higher-order questions about the influence of the jury’s composition on its 
deliberations were even less informative, as they produced data that contradicted significant 
behavioral findings.154 
Put another way, the principal findings of Sommers were that racially diverse mock 
juries had longer, more complete, and more factually accurate deliberations than homogeneous 
juries, and that race-relevant voir dire questions led jurors to render more lenient judgments than 
did race-neutral questions.155  Had the study relied exclusively on self-reports, however, its 
conclusions would have drastically underestimated the impact of race.  The data would have 
indicated that neither the racial composition of the jury nor the racial content of voir dire 
influenced jurors’ verdict preferences or deliberations.  Furthermore, with the exception of the 
assessment of jurors’ participation rates, conclusions regarding different aspects of the 
deliberations would have been inconclusive and contradictory. 
It is quite possible that the influence of race is a topic particularly ill-suited to research 
using self-report measures.  Race may affect decision-making and perceptions in ways that are 
less accessible to conscious awareness than the effects of other factors.  Moreover, self-
presentational concerns may be especially acute when race is involved.  But self-report measures 
concerning race are not unique in that their reliability varies considerably depending on the 
precise nature of the research question.  For example, researchers interested in examining 
                                                                 
145 Group M = 2.59 on a 1-9 scale. 
146 F (1, 25) < 1. 
147 Group M = 2.61. 
148 Fs <1. 
149 See also Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know, supra note 7, at 1000-01 (reviewing the 
use of juror interviews in the investigation of race in deciding criminal cases).  See generally Sommers, On Racial 
Diversity, supra note 89 (examining the effects of racial diversity on jury decision-making). 
150 Id., at 601; Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know, supra note 7, at 1001. 
151 Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know, supra note 7, at 1000-01. 
152 See Sommers & Ellsworth, Unpublished Data, supra note 125. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra note 89, at 608; Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really 
Know, supra note 7, at 1026-28. 
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sensitive questions related to prejudice of any sort—whether based on race, gender, class, or even 
physical attractiveness—should consider the possibility that self-report measures are particularly 
problematic.  Moreover, the mock jurors in the Sommers study were also wrong about matters 
completely unrelated to race, such as the thoroughness of their deliberations and fellow jurors’ 
feelings about their experience.156  Thus, although using self-report measures to research the 
effects of race on jury decision-making may be cause for special concern, the present case study 
provides no reason to think that the perils of self-report measures are limited to questions 
involving sensitive topics. 
The present case study compares behavioral outcomes and interview data obtained from 
mock jurors in a simulation, not from actual jurors.157  Comparisons within the same studies 
conducted with actual jurors would be extremely informative, but with few exceptions (e.g., the 
AJP research in which jury deliberations were videotaped), the only behavioral outcomes that can 
be measured with real jurors are crude ones such as length of deliberation and final verdict.  
Experimental simulations therefore provide the best opportunity to compare interview and 
behavioral data about the same issues. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF JUROR SELF-REPORTS 
Asking jurors about their attitudes, their reactions to the trial, their impressions of the 
deliberation process, or the factors that influenced them is one of the simplest and most 
straightforward ways to learn about jury decision-making.  Jurors answer our questions, often 
quite confidently, but for a variety of reasons we must sometimes be cautious about taking their 
answers at face value.  Before turning to when and under what circumstances relying on self-
reports is most problematic, consider the major concerns we have discussed.158  First, memory 
fades over time and it can be distorted by information learned after the original event.  That 
confident recollections of eyewitnesses often turn out to be mistaken is well known to empirical 
legal researchers, and we should be alert to the danger of inaccurate memories in jurors as well.  
Second, jurors, like everyone, want to look competent and unbiased, and so tend to be unwilling 
to admit that they were influenced by impermissible factors; that their decisions were more 
emotional than rational; or that the legal instructions were so turgid and boring that they stopped 
listening.  Finally, few human beings in any context can consistently and accurately identify the 
true causes of their behavior—although they are almost always willing to try—and researchers 
should be skeptical about answers to questions about higher-order cognitive processes. 
A.  When Are Jurors’ Self Reports Most and Least Useful? 
If a researcher’s goal is to generate hypotheses about what ordinary people notice and 
care about when they serve as jurors, asking for free narrative descriptions about their thoughts 
during the trial and their discussions during deliberations can produce a wealth of information, 
revealing issues that mattered to the jurors but might not have occurred to the researchers.  For 
instance, CJP interviews found that the defendant’s remorse and future dangerousness were 
central to many juries’ deliberations, as were the character and behavior of the victim, even when 
                                                                 
156 See Sommers & Ellsworth, Unpublished Data, supra note 125. 
157 Id. 
158 See supra Part I. 
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these considerations were not emphasized by the attorneys.159  Open-ended interviews tend to be 
the best method for discovering issues that were important to individual jurors in a case, even 
better than observing videotaped deliberations—after all, many jurors vote but say very little, and 
so analyses of deliberations do not reveal much about their thoughts.160 
Interviews are also the best way to discover jurors’ feelings about their experience after 
the case has been decided.  Are they satisfied?  Ambivalent?  Anxious?  Regretful?  Do they now 
think of arguments they wish they had made during deliberations?  Reflecting back, are there 
things that might have made their task easier?  What did they like most about the experience?  
Least?  These are retrospective questions about jurors’ subjective impressions—not about what 
actually influenced them, but rather about how they feel about their experiences after the fact.  
These feelings might affect their performance as jurors if they serve again, as well as their general 
attitudes towards the jury system. 
Questions that require jurors to recall particular, discrete events, such as their votes 
during deliberation, also produce fairly reliable data.  In the Sommers mock jury experiment, 
participants accurately estimated how often they and other jurors spoke during deliberations, a 
task that seems even more difficult than recalling voting history.161  Of course, this study required 
them to report on an hour-long deliberation immediately after it ended, whereas interviews with 
actual jurors often involve much longer deliberations that occurred much earlier.162  Jurors’ 
answers to questions about what they felt before the trial are less trustworthy than questions about 
specific events.  People often believe that what they feel now is what they felt earlier, and they 
may reinterpret the past to match the present.163  However, jurors may also fear that their 
responses will cast them in a negative light, and therefore admissions of inappropriate behavior, 
such as deciding on a verdict before hearing all the evidence, are particularly persuasive. 
More problematic are questions that move beyond memory of the case and subjective 
experience, assessing instead jurors’ evaluations of the trial or deliberation process.  Interviewers 
often ask jurors for their opinions about the evidence, witnesses, attorneys, and other trial 
principals—questions more susceptible to reconstructive, post-trial biases than simple factual 
recollections about votes.  Initial perceptions of a witness might change when subsequent events 
cast doubt on her testimony, and retrospective reports might not reflect the juror’s initial 
impressions. 
Moreover, unless a researcher’s primary goal is to learn what enhances juror satisfaction, 
she will likely learn little from jurors’ assessments of the effectiveness of various aspects of the 
trial.  Jurors may report that a particular feature of the trial helped them do their job, but objective 
measures often suggest otherwise.  For instance, jurors reported that getting written instructions 
                                                                 
159 See generally Bowers, supra note 29. 
160 See Bowers, supra note 2, n.208, 210 (noting that asking open-ended questions in CJP interviews 
produced richer and more detailed information about deliberations than structured questions alone); Diamond, Beyond 
Fantasy and Nightmare, supra note 7, at 757-58 (discussing variability in how much individual jurors talk during 
deliberations). 
161 See Sommers & Ellsworth, Unpublished Data, supra note 125. 
162 See, e.g., William J. Bowers, Wanda D. Foglia, Susan Ehrhard-Dietzel, and Christopher E. Kelly, Jurors’ 
Failure to Understand or Comport with Constitutional Standards in Capital Sentencing: Strength of the Evidence, 6 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 1147, 1173 (2010) (calculating the median time between trial and interview of CJP jurors from 353 cases as 2.22 
years). 
163 See generally Daryl J. Bem & H. Keith McConnell, Testing the Self-Perception Explanation of 
Dissonance Phenomena: On the Salience of Premanipulation Attitudes, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 23 (1970). 
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helped them to better understand the law, but they showed no better understanding than did jurors 
who got them only orally.164  Jurors’ satisfaction with the clarity of the judge’s instructions also 
reveals little about their effectiveness: Young, Cameron, and Tinsley found fundamental 
misunderstandings of the law even among jurors who reported finding the judge’s instructions 
helpful and clear.165 
Similar problems arise with questions that do not focus on the particular trial, but rather 
assess more general attitudes about the legal system.  The assumption that people have stable 
attitudes about legal issues is questionable, particularly when the attitudes involve subjects the 
person knew little about before serving on the jury.  Some legal attitudes, such as attitudes 
towards capital punishment, are familiar and fairly stable over time.166  Others, such as attitudes 
towards punitive damages or the duty to retreat before using force in self defense, may not have 
existed before trial, and jurors’ answers to questions about them may not reflect long-standing 
pre-existing attitudes, but rather ideas that originated during their jury service.167  If researchers 
want to learn about jurors’ attitudes after serving on the jury, there is no problem; if they want to 
study the effect of stable, pre-existing attitudes on jury decision-making, there may be. 
Our analyses suggest that self-report data are almost hopelessly problematic when jurors 
are asked to report on aspects of the trial or deliberation—such as fairness, comprehensiveness, or 
overall quality—that implicitly but necessarily require a basis for comparison.  Answers to these 
questions can tell us how satisfied the juror is, but not how fair the trial or how thorough the 
deliberation actually was.  Comparison of self-report and behavioral data also confirms the 
unreliability of jurors’ self-reported perceptions of higher-order deliberation processes.  The 
Sommers study provides an illustrative example, as mock jurors could not accurately assess 
aspects of deliberations such as the comprehensiveness of their jury’s discussions or their own 
influence on fellow jurors.168  Jurors were also poor reporters of the subjective experiences of 
other jurors, tending to assume that all members of the jury reacted the same way they did.169 
Likewise, people are often unable to provide accurate explanations for their own or their 
jury’s decision.  Asking jurors to describe how they made up their mind and arrived at a verdict is 
highly unlikely to provide valid information, whether the questions are pitched at the individual 
level—asking a particular juror to explain the factors behind her decision—or at the group level—
asking respondents to recall how their jury reached unanimity.  Mock jurors in the Sommers 
study, for example, denied that they were affected by race during deliberations or that their jury’s 
racial composition affected their decision-making process.170  Similarly, Professors Hans and 
Doob found that mock jurors were more likely to find a defendant guilty when they learned of his 
criminal history, despite their insistence that this evidence played no part in their decision.171  
                                                                 
164 Heuer & Penrod, Instructing Jurors, supra note 83, at 420. 
165 Young, Tinsley & Cameron, supra note 33, at 97; cf. Zander & Henderson, supra note 33, at 216-17 
(finding that few British jurors reported difficulty in understanding the judge’s summing up of the law). 
166 Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans’ Views on the Death 
Penalty, 50 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 19, 25 (1994). 
167 See Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory, supra note 13, for a discussion of how people underestimate 
the extent to which their attitudes have changed over time. 
168 Sommers & Ellsworth, Unpublished Data, supra note 125. 
169 See supra Part III.B-C. 
170 Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra note 89, at 174. 
171 Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of 
Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L. Q. 235, 242, 249 (1975-76). 
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Though they may have offered this information in good faith, behavioral data demonstrate that 
they were mistaken.172  Actual jury deliberations are secret and unrecorded, and behavioral data 
from actual juries are few and far between.  Therefore, higher-order questions regarding causal 
influences or requiring relative judgments—questions typically beyond the cognitive capabilities 
of respondents—are better addressed by simulation studies that include behavioral measures. 
B.  Alternatives to Self-Reports 
There is no single best alternative for the researcher interested in examining the 
processes by which jurors and juries make decisions.  Different methods are suitable for different 
questions.  Archival analyses can identify some factors that predict jury outcomes, but they shed 
little light on the causal processes underlying this influence.173 For that purpose, a better 
alternative is the use of jury simulation studies to determine the ways in which individual 
judgments are formed and translated into group-level verdicts.  Such studies are time- and labor-
intensive, but as our examination of race and jury decision-making studies indicates, total reliance 
on interview data can prevent researchers from discovering important processes or influences, and 
can even lead to inaccurate conclusions about the direction of relations among variables.174  Of 
course, mock juror studies that rely exclusively on post-deliberation self-reports are susceptible to 
the same criticisms as interviews with actual jurors, and face additional limitations of realism and 
generalizability. 
Alternative methods are available to researchers who seek to relate jurors’ perceptions of 
specific case factors to their verdict preferences.  Experiments can isolate the influence of a 
specific factor on juror decisions.  For example, mock jury research has demonstrated the extent 
to which an expert witness influences juror decision-making, as well as the characteristics that 
render such testimony more or less persuasive.175  Another strategy is to get independent ratings 
of the comprehensibility and persuasiveness of expert testimony, and then to determine whether 
these ratings predict verdicts in a sample of cases. 
Some research objectives are easier than others to achieve using alternative measures.  In 
research on juror comprehension, for example, jurors’ assessments of their own competence can 
be supplemented or replaced by direct tests of their understanding of evidence or judicial 
instructions.  But we propose that with a bit of creativity, there are few jury-related research 
                                                                 
172 Id. at 242-49. 
173 See Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, & Marilynn B. Brewer, Experimentation in Social Psychology, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 99, 100-05 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, & Gardner Lindsey eds., 4th 
ed. 1998) (discussing the superiority of experiments to correlational methods for uncovering causal processes). 
174 See infra Part III. 
175 See generally Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Hedy R. Dexter, The Eyewitness, the Expert 
Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 311 (1989) (demonstrating that the presence of expert testimony 
improved juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence in a study where mock jurors were shown a realistic videotaped trial 
centered around eyewitness evidence); Natalie J. Gabora, Nicholas P. Spanos & Amanda Joab, The Effects of Complainant 
Age and Expert Psychological Testimony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 103 (1993) 
(demonstrating that, in a simulated sexual abuse trial, jurors voted to convict more often and rated the defendant as less 
credible when presented with expert psychological testimony specific to the case); Margaret Bull Kovera, April W. 
Gresham, Eugene Borgida, Ellen Gray & Pamela C. Regan, Does Expert Psychological Testimony Inform or Influence 
Juror Decision Making? A Social Cognitive Analysis, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 178 (1997) (demonstrating that in a 
simulated sexual abuse trial with a child witness, repetitive expert testimony bolstered the child’s testimony, whereas 
concrete and standard expert testimony did not). 
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questions accessible only through self-report data.  Consider jurors’ subjective experiences, such 
as emotional responses to evidence.  It is true that the most straightforward approach would be to 
simply ask jurors how different aspects of the case made them feel.176  Indeed, even mock jury 
experiments that measure juror emotion often use self-report measures.177  But it also would be 
possible to code mock deliberations for jurors’ emotional responses.  Face-to-face interviews with 
former jurors could be video recorded and analyzed to determine whether self-reported emotional 
reactions to the trial coincide with behavioral evidence of emotion.  No research methodology is 
without its limitations, and any empirical findings are most persuasive when supported by 
multiple methods. 
C.  Techniques for Improving the Validity of Self-Report Data 
Knowing the hazards of interview research enables a researcher to take measures to 
counteract them, although these measures may be more or less effective depending upon the 
research question.  Failures of memory grow worse with time.  Therefore, the sooner the jurors 
can be interviewed, the better.  It would be best to interview jurors before they leave the 
courthouse, before they have a chance to describe and justify their behavior to family and friends.  
Occasionally this is possible, though not often.  Lawyers and jury consultants sometimes 
interview jurors right after a trial, and may be willing to include researchers in the process.  When 
immediate interviews are impossible, researchers should be sure to record the amount of time 
between the interview and the events in question.  In order to ensure standardization across jurors 
and cases, a researcher should seek to maintain a consistent, ideally short duration throughout a 
study.  But no matter what, keeping track of duration is essential because it makes possible 
statistical analysis that includes passage of time as a factor.  For instance, such analyses would 
permit a researcher to determine whether varying levels of comprehension observed during 
interviews truly indicate that some jurors did not understand judicial instructions at trial, or rather 
are attributable to differences among respondents in the gap between the trial and interview.  It 
might also be the case that the relation between two variables—such as perceptions of a particular 
aspect of the case and final verdict—differs in strength among respondents depending on how 
much time has elapsed since trial. 
If a researcher is interested in the effects of pre-existing legal attitudes, she would be 
well-advised to measure them before trial.  There is good reason to believe that a juror’s 
experiences during the trial and deliberations can influence more general attitudes towards various 
aspects of the law and the legal system.178  Furthermore, it is likely that such processes are subtle, 
so that jurors are unaware that their attitudes about the system have been affected by their recent 
experience.  When researchers plan to interview actual jurors, they should consider seeking 
                                                                 
176 See, e.g., Bienen, supra note 30 (employing interviews with jurors from homicide and capital trials in 
New Jersey to inform a study of the usefulness of post-verdict debriefing for jurors in emotionally disturbing trials); 
Kelley, supra note 30 (using the results of a questionnaire sent to jurors who deliberated in forty-four murder trials in Iowa 
to draw conclusions about juror stress). 
177 See, e.g., David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, 
and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006) (employing self-report measures to determine the 
influence of gruesome evidence on the emotional states of mock jurors). 
178 Dennis Devine, Laura Clayton, Benjamin Dunford, Ramsy Seying & Jennifer Pryce, Jury Decision 
Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 677 (2001) 
(discussing research on the effect of jury service on people’s legal attitudes and how they approach subsequent jury 
service). 
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permission to administer measures of pre-existing attitudes to the jury pool before petit juries are 
empanelled.  Another strategy would be to add questions to the attorneys’ pretrial questionnaire or 
to later obtain access to voir dire transcripts or jury selection questionnaires to discover pre-trial 
legal attitudes. 
For some questions, there is a gold standard to which jurors’ memory can be compared.  
For example, if the researcher is interested in the jurors’ memories for lay or expert testimony, 
responses can be compared to the trial transcript.  If the researcher is interested in the jurors’ 
understanding of the law, simply asking them how well they understood the judge’s instructions is 
unlikely to provide useful information.  A better strategy is to ask specific questions about the law 
and compare the answers to the instructions.179  Discrepancies between jurors’ responses and the 
transcript or judicial instructions reveal not only general levels of accuracy, but also where 
mistakes occur. 
On the other hand, there is no gold standard for a juror’s memory of what happened 
during deliberations, except in those exceedingly rare cases when deliberations are recorded.  
However, the researcher may consider using agreement among jurors as a check on the accuracy 
of self-report information.180  To the extent that jurors can provide accurate information about the 
content and scope of deliberations, there should be relative agreement among responses of jurors 
on the same juries, or among jurors in the majority and jurors in the minority.  Professor Vidmar 
also offers the useful recommendation of interviewing jurors in groups to allow them to refresh 
each others’ memories.181  Of course, the more subjective the assessment, the less consistency 
among respondents that can be expected.  But for self-reports regarding factual information, such 
a reliability check could serve as a useful way to confirm that a particular question generates 
accurate and meaningful data, as well as to identify individual jurors and juries whose reliability 
appears to be more problematic. 
Biases related to jurors’ desire to present themselves in a favorable light are harder to 
counteract.  The usual guarantees of anonymity are important, but probably not completely 
effective.  If the researcher is interested in whether inadmissible evidence or other extralegal 
considerations surfaced during deliberations, a good technique is to ask whether anyone raised 
these topics, and how other jurors responded, so that the respondent is not made to feel personally 
accountable.  For instance, Young, Cameron, and Tinsley asked jurors if anyone raised concerns 
based on sympathy or prejudice, and how the other jurors reacted.182  Of course, as alluded to 
above, any prejudicial or otherwise socially undesirable answers that jurors do give are 
particularly worth noting.  As for finding out the real reasons for jurors’ perceptions or decisions, 
no amount of determination will extract true answers from self-reports.  People are generally 
unable to identify the factors that affected their decisions, although they are perfectly able to 
generate spurious answers to an interviewer’s questions.183 
                                                                 
179 See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, Instructing Jurors, supra note 83, at 420 (noting that despite jurors’ 
assessments of written judicial instructions as helpful, those who received them performed no better than others on a post-
trial multiple choice test about the relevant law); see also supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. 
180 See, e.g., Young, Tinsley & Cameron, supra note 33, at 92. 
181 Vidmar, supra note 7, at 57-58. 
182 Young, Tinsley & Cameron, supra note 33, at 97. 
183 See generally Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 17. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Every research method has strengths and weaknesses, and almost every research 
question can be answered more cogently by using more than one method.  Using multiple 
methods allows the researcher to use the strengths of one method to compensate for the 
weaknesses of another.184  Indeed, several of the more impressive and persuasive interview 
studies we have described did not rely exclusively on interview data, but also include archival or 
behavioral analysis.  For example, the CJP185 and the research conducted by the NCSC186 relied in 
large part on interviews with jurors and judges, but also included analysis of actual jury outcomes 
and compositions.  So, too, did the Arizona Jury Project study, which was actually a field 
experiment comparing data—self-report and observation of actual deliberations—from juries 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: permitted or not permitted to engage in pre-
deliberation discussions.187  In this manner, the investigators were able to combine the enhanced 
generalizability of juror interviews and archival analysis with the experimental control of a mock 
jury study.188 
Our goal in this Article has not been to discourage juror interviews or the use of self-
reports, or to suggest that findings from studies using these methods should be disregarded.  To 
the contrary, juror interviews remain an essential tool in the empirical investigation of juries.  We 
hope that our literature review and detailed case study of race and legal judgment prompt 
researchers to think carefully about the differences among types of interview questions, the 
importance of multiple methods, and the ways in which interviews can be utilized to their fullest 
potential.  We anticipate that others will add their own suggestions to our list of recommendations 
and cautionary tales, generating a more complete assessment of the methods used by the 
burgeoning field of empirical legal research.  And we hope that future researchers, while still 
making use of interview methodologies, will also heed the call to continue to develop new and 
creative ways of investigating jury decision-making that are not wholly reliant upon self-report. 
 
                                                                 
184 Donald T. Campbell & Donald W. Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-
Multimethod Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81, 104 (1959); see also Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know, 
supra note 7, at 997-98 (listing the primary methodologies used to analyze the relationship between race and criminal jury 
trials); HANS, supra note 49, at 17 (combining experimental, survey, and interview methodologies in the context of civil 
juries in business regulation and litigation as a “research approach to triangulation”). 
185 See Bowers, supra note 29, at 1077. 
186 See Hannaford-Agor & Hans, Nullification at Work, supra note 29, at 1253; Hans, Hannaford & 
Munsterman, supra note 32, at 349. 
187 See Diamond, Vidmar, Rose, Ellis & Murphy, supra note 82, at 5 (reporting findings from videotaped 
deliberations of fifty juries as well as the results of post-deliberation questionnaires).  See generally Mary R. Rose & Shari 
Seidman Diamond, Offstage Behavior: Real Jurors’ Scrutiny of Non-Testimonial Conduct, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 311 (2009) 
(observing videotaped jury discussion and deliberation in Arizona to evaluate the practice of allowing civil jurors to 
discuss evidence mid-trial). 
188 See Diamond, Vidmar, Rose, Ellis & Murphy, supra note 82, at 5. 
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